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Bulow and Rogoff (1988) have shown that  Under such circumstances, secondary
auction-based purchases of debt may not be an  market prices fail to reflect the insurance vaiue
effective way to capture the secondary market  reserves have to debtors but not to creditors -
discount, since the purchase pushes up the  since, after all, the secondary market reflects
secondary market afterward.  (The problem is  mostly intrabank transactions.
that marginal debt is bought back at an average
price, while the marginal price is substantially  Since a country can always opt not to use its
below the average if more debt reduces credit-  reserve for debt service, reserves have an
worthiness.)  insurance value that is specific to the cou  y.
This insurance value will thus not be reflected in
Van Wijnbergen points out another problem  the price at which the country can buy back debt
with cash debt buybacks - one that arises  in the secondary market using its reserves.
because terms-of-trade-contingent instruments
do not exist in international capital markets, and  As a result, the country buying back debt
because of the differences in risk aversion that  with reserves clearly ends up worse off (in terms
one may plausibly assume to cxist between  of expected utility), even if it succeeds in captur-
commercial creditors and the developing coun-  ing the full secondary market discount
tries that are their debtor clients.  prevailing before the buyback - because the
buyback reduces the insurance possibilities open
to the country.
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1 Introduction
The  debt  crisis  in 1982  was followed  by deep  discounts  in  the
secondary  market  for  LDC  debt.  These  discounts  have  ever  since  held  out
the  tantalizing  possibility  of relatively  painless  debt  relief  through
cash  debt  buy  backs,  in  which  a debtor  buys  back  discounted  debt  for  cash
(foreign  reserves).  Through  such  a transaction  a debtor  would  effectively
prepay  its  debt  and  in  return  receive  the  discount  on  principal  implied  by
the  secondary  market  price.  Bankers  would  presumably  not object  since  the
secondary  market  price  of their  claims  on LDC  debtors  reflects  the
market's  assessment  o. the  value  of those  claims.
While  such  cash  buy  backs  have  indeed  taken  place,  their  use  as an
instrument  of debt  relief  has  remained  controversial.  For  example  Rulow
and  Rogoff  (1988)  point  out  that  auction  based  purchases  of debt  may  not
be an effective  way of  capturing  the  discount  since  the  purchase  pushes  up
the  secondary  market  afterwards;  since  the  alternative  to taking  part  in
the  auctior.  is  selling  at the  "post-deal"  secondary  market  price,  only  the
"post-deal"  secondary  market  discount  is  captured  by the  debtor,  while
creditors  make a capital  gain  on the  debt  not  sold  (see  also  Dooley  (1988)
on this  point).  The  basic  problem  is that  marginal  debt is  bought  back  at
average  price,  while  the  marginal  price  is  substantially  below  the  average
if  more  debt  reduces  creditworthiness.
They  also  argue  that  banks  will  be worse  off  after  such  purchases  if
reserves  would  have  been  available  for  debt  service  anyhow,  but  better  off
(and  the  country  correspondingly  worse  off) if  reserves  now  used  for  the
buy  back  would  have  remained  out  of reach  of the  creditors  otherwise.  But
it is  of course  at the  discretion  of the  country  how to  use  its  reserves3
when  not  used for  debt  buy  backs.  It  is thus  somewhat  unsatisfactory  to
leave  reserve  use  exogenous  (beyond  the  decision  to  use  them  for  a  buy
back of discounted  debt).  Thus  endogenizing  reserve  use  is the  starting
point  of this  note.
But  the  main  point  of this  note  is,  to draw  attention  to another
problem  with cash  buy  back.,  a  problem  that  is  related  to  the  non-
existence  of  terms  of  trade  contingent  instruments  in  international
capital  markets.  To bring  out  this  point  clearly  we  abstract  from  the
problems  with  cash  buy  backs  discussed  in  the  literature;  they  have  been
adequately  covered  elsewhere.  Instead  we focus  on  a different  problem,  one
that  arises  from  the  non-existence  of terms  of trade  contingent
instruments  in international  capital  markets  and  differences  in risk
aversion  that  one  may  plausibly  assume  to exist  between  commercial
creditors  and their  LDC  debtor  clients.  Commercial  creditors  are  by and
large  companies  with  stockmarket  quotation;  and  theory  has established
that  under  fairly  general  conditions  managers  of quoted  companies  should
simply  maximize  the  expected  value  of discounted  net  cash  flow.  In such
circumstances  secondary  market  prices  fail  to reflect  the  insurance  value
reserves  have to  debtors  but  not  to  creditors,  since,  after  all,  the
secondary  market  mostly  reflects  intra-bank  transactions.  We show  that,  as
a consequence,  the  country  buying  back  debt  with reserves  ends  up
unambiguously  worse  off  in  expected  utility  terms  even  if it  succeeds  in
capturing  the  full  secondary  market  discount.
2  The  Model
Consider  a simple  two  period,  one  good  world  where  a  country  faces4
uncertain  income  streams  (in  a  multi-good  extension,  the  uncertainty  could
be related  to random  variations  in the  terms  of trade).  Random  income  in
period  2 equals  O. The  set  of all  possible  0 is  denoted  by (0).  For  the
purpose  of this  note,  it is  not  necessary  to explicitly  consider  the
intertemporal  allocation  of consumption;  we simply  assume  that  consumers
have  made their  optimal  decisions  in  period  1 given  all  the  information
available  at that  time.  After  these  decisions,  plus  the  realization  of
income  in  period  1, the  country  enters  period  2  with  debt  service
obligations  D and  a stock  of  reserves  R. Thus  in the  absence  of default  or
debt  buy  backs,  consumption  in  period  two  equals:
(1)  C(M)  - O+R-D,  O e  (O)
Without  a default,  the  consumer's  expected  welfare  WND  equals
(2)  WND - E9U(O+R-D),
with  U'>O,  U'"<O  for  all  values  of  C. Eo is  the  expected  value  operator
defined  over (9).
What  happens  to the  debtor  in the  case  of default  is  an unsettled
issue  (see  Eaton,  Gersovitz  and  Stiglitz  (1986)  for  a  discussion).  Since
this  is  only  of  peripheral  importance  for  the  points  raised  in  this  note,
we simply  assume  that  welfare  is  lowered  by A  in  the  case  of a default.
Thus in  case  of default,  second  period  expected  welfare  equals:
(3)  WD - E U(O+R) - A,5
The  net  effect  of a  default  on  W in  of course  ambiguous.  Welfare  increases
because  after  default  debt  service  payments  D  will  not  be  made,  but it
falls  because  of the  default  penalty  A.  We assume,  once  again  for
simplicity,  that  the  default  penalty  is  all  or  nothing;  thus  partial
defaults  will  not take  place.
Whether  default  takes  place  for  a given  value  of 0 depends  on  whether
WD exceeds  WND for  that  value  of 0  or  not.  We can  partition  the  range  of 0
in an  area  where  this  will  be the  case  and  in  an  area  where  it  will  not:
4)  °  e  (°D  - WD > WND  ;  9  e  (0)ND  - WD s  WND; ( 1D  +  MND  (
Define  0  as the  value (or  values)  of 0 for  which  W  equals  W
(5)  H(7) - U(7+R) - A  - U(7+R-D) - O
Clearly  the  following  holds:
(6)  8H(O) _ U'(0+R) - U'(0+R-D) - U"'(9+R-D+A(P)) <  0
ci0
for  all  0  and,  by application  of  Rolle's  theorem  (Apostol  (1974)),  for  at
least  one  A(0).  The  curvature  conditions  imposed  on  U plus the  inequality
in (6)  imply:
(7)  (t)hro(01bit  of tr  ND-{010  <  de;
Thus the probability of there NOT being a default, w, equals:6
(8) X  - Pr(  >7)
Lenders  are  of course  aware  of a'.  this.  narthermore  lenders  are
assumed  to  be risk  neutral.  The  rationale  for  this  assumption  in  that  bank
managers  can  raise  funds  in international  stock  markets  where  their  share
holders  can  diversify  country  specific  risk  by properly  structuring  their
portfolios.  The  secondary  market  evaluation  of the  claim  on the  debtor
therefore  equals:
(9) V5(D)  - iD
One  final  assumption  before  we turn  to the  analysis  of cash  debt  buy
backs.  We would  like,  for  better  focus,  to eliminate  the  problems  due  to
buying  marginal  debt  at average  prices  highlighted  by Bulow  and  Rogoff
(1988)  and  Dooley  (1988)  from  the  analysis.  This  problem  will in  fact
disappear  if the  distribution  is  such  that  average  and  marginal  prices
become  equal.  One  example  of such  a  distribution  is:
(9)  Prob(89-H)  - 1IH,  Prob(0-0L)  - 1-1H; \  l+H-  i  OH  +  R - D > 0  > 0  +  R.
Equ.  (9)  implies:
(10)  fr  - nIH.
or the  probability  of default  equals  the  probability  of a  bad state  of
nature,  L.7
3  Cash  Debt  Buy  Backs
In the  case  of a cash  debt  buy  back,  the  country  spends  some  of its
reserves  to  buy  back debt  from  its  creditors  at the  secondary  market
price.  Since  the  choice  of  distribution  for  9  guarantees  that  the
post-deal  secondary  market  price  will  equal  the  pre-deal  price,  we might
as  well assume  the  use  of all  reserves  R; this  does  not  lead  to  any  loss
of generality.  Thus  reserves  fall  by R and  the  debt  declines  by R/w.
Define  the  remaining  debt  as  Dr
(3.1)  Dr  - D - R/w
Since  the  buy  back is  executed  at the  end  of  period  one,  nothing
happens  to first  period  welfare;  it suffices  to  look  at second  period
welfare.  Consider  first  welfare  without  a debt  buy  back,  WN. Since
aL  <  H  <  'Hp
default  occurs  in  state  L  but  debt  will  be fully  serviced  in state  H. Thus
expected  welfare  equals:
(12)  WN - rU(OH+R-D)  +  (1-r)(U(OL+R)  - A)
- lrU(OH- (1-1r)R/xr-Dr)  +  (1-v)U(8L+R)  - XI
using  (11)  and  with A'-(l-i)A  defined  for  notational  convenience.
Consider  next the  case  of  a debt  buy  back  in  which  reserves  R are8
used to repurchase  R/w  worth  of claims  on the  country,  thus  extinguishing
those  claims.  Note  that  in this  case  the  country  succeeds  in  capturing  the
full  discount  in the  secondary  market.  Because  9L  < O,  here  will  be a
default  in the  bad  state  of  nature.  Thus  expected  welfare  in the  case  of
the  buy  back operation  equals:
(13)  WBB-  ffU(OH-Dr)  + (l1-r)U(CL)  -
The  welfare  effects  of the  buy  back  operation  can  be assessed  by
comparing  WN and  WBB:
(14)  AW - WBB - WN
- W(U(eH-Dr)-U(OH- (1-r)R/w-Dr))  +  (l-r)(U(OL)-U(P  L+R))
Once  again  applying  Rolle's  theorem  allows  us to  write (14)  as
(15)  AW - wU-(OH-Dr-A  )(1-r)R/r  (-1ff)U'(OL+A 2)R
- f%l-w)R*(U'(GH-Dr-Al)  -U(OI  2)
for  at least  one  pair  A1,  A2, O<° 1<(l-)R/a, O)A  2<R.
The intuition  is  stiaightforward:  utility  in each  state  of  nature
changes  after  a debt  buy  back;  in  the  good  state  of  nature,  debt  service
will decline  with  corresponding  increase  in  consumption.  In the  bad state
of  nature,  the  decline  in scheduled  debt  service  because  of the  debt  buy
back is of  no help  since  no debt  is serviced  anyhow.  But  reserves  have9
been exhausted  by the  debt  buy  back  and  can  thus  not  be diverted  from  debt
service  to consumption  anymore.
The  net effect  can  in fact  be signed  unambiguously  by once  again
applying  Rolle's  theorem:
(16)  AW - (l-))RU (<  0A2+A3)*('H-@L-Al  A2 R-Dr)
for  at least  one  A3 in the  range  (0,  H 9_L-Al-A 2-R-Dr).  This  can  in fact  be
signed  unambiguously,  because:
(17a)  O<A<(l-w)R/ir;  0<A2<R;  and
(17b)  aH - (l-.)R/m  - Dr  > 7 > 9L + R
Combining  (17a,b)  yields  0H-OL-  1-A  2-R-Dr  > 0  and  thus  the  inequality  at
the  end  of (16).  Define  A as the  relative  rate  of risk  aversion:  A -
-CU  '/U'.  It  then  helps  to  rewrite  equ.  (16)  as follows:
(18)  W  BB  |  rp(l-v)rA  < 0
AD - R/w,  the  amount  of  debt  bought  back.  and  rp  is  a proportionality
constant; Cp  - OH  LA 1 -lA  2-R-D  d/(V9  +  A  >O  sng(7,) 0~~~~  r  L  AL^  2R~r/°+ 2-,3) >  0,  Using  (17a,b).
(18)  indicates  that  a cash  buy  back  of external  debt,  even  if fully
executed  at the  pre-buy  back  secondary  market  price,  unambiguously  lowers
the  country's  welfare.  The  welfare  loss  increases  with  the  variance  of the
stochastic  element  in the  country's  income  stream  ((l-w)w)  and  with the10
country's  degree  of risk  aversion.  The Interpretation  of this  result  is
simple.  Reserves,  since  the  country  car,  exercise  the  option  not to  devote
them  to debt  service  in  bad states  of  nature,  have  an insurance  value  that
increases  with the  degree  of  uncertainty  embedded  in the  country's  income
stream  and  with  the  degree  to  which  the  country  is  averse  to carrying  such
risks.  But  since  the  secondary  market  mainly  reflects  trade  between  risk
neutral  foreign  corporations,  this  country  specific  insurance  value  of
reserves  is  not  reflected  in  the  price  at  which  risk  neutral  creditors  are
willing  to  exchange  debt  for  cash.  Hence  the  welfare  loss  when  a country
trades  reserves  for  debt  at the  expected  value  of debt  established  in  the
secondary  market.'/
4  Conclusions
This  note  has  established  that,  in  addition  to  the  marginal  debt  at
average  price  issue  highlighted  by Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988),  Dooley  (1988)
and  others,  there  are  other  problems  with  cash  debt  buy  backs.  In
particular  we show  that,  since  a  country  can  always  opt  not  to  use its
reserves  for  debt  service  in  bad states  of nature,  reserves  have an
insurance  value  that  is  specific  to the  country.  This  insurance  value  will
thus  not  be reflected  in the  price  at  which  the  country  can  buy  back  debt
in  the  secondary  market  using  its  reserves.  We show  that  because  of this
problem  cash  buy  backs  lead  to  an  unambiguous  welfare  loss  to  the  country
even  if the  marginal  debt  at average  price  issue  highlighted  by Bulow  and
lHelpman  (1989)  also  focuses  on the  change  in insurance  value  of
foreign  liabilities  as a result  of debt  restructuring.  He focuses
on debt  equity  swaps,  however,  and  does  not  discuss  the  insurance
value  of reserves  or cash  debt  buy  backs.11
Rogoff  (1988),  Dooley  (1988)  and  others  does  not arise.  The  reason  is  that
a cash  debt  buy  back  reduces  insurance  possibilities  open  to the  country.
Of course  this  issue  is  much less  important  if  the  debt  reduction  is so
large  that  no incentive  is  left  for  future  default  under  any  circumstance;
however  then  the  Bulow/Rogoff/Dooley  issue  comes  up  whether  it  is in fact
possible  to  capture  the  discount  through  such  market  based  buy  backs.
The  conclusions  shou]d  to some  extent  be qualified  by pointing  out
their  dependence  on the  particular  model  for  a secondary  market  discount.
I  am not  referring  to the  restrictive  distributional  assumptions  embedded
in (9);  these  simply  serve  to  eliminate  the  problem  of differences  between
average  and  marginal  price  of  dcebt,  an impoetant  issue,  but one  that  is
adequately  dealt  with in  the  existing  literature.  More  important  is the
assumption,  shared  in  most of the  literature  (in  particular  by all  the
authors  listed  below)  that  creditors  and  debtors  have the  same  prior  on
the  distribution  of 9.  Asymmetric  information  opens  up a  host of other
issues,  such  as the  existence  of signaling  equilibria  in  which  reserve  buy
backs  could  possibly  play  a role.
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